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feminist mysticism
BY CAROL IANNONE

I t is certainly no news that feminism is not what it used '" ,
Interested observers have perhaps been surprised to hear fcn 11111 "
glorifying family life and extolling many aspects of traditional kni.:.
behavior. But yes, we are being told that the movement has P·'"'
out of its first stage. First-stage or egalitarian feminism was und,.
mined by the absurdity of its own implications. In the fevered Lk't!
to be equal to men, women found that their own biological n;11 11 :.
became their worst enemy. We have been told that a .:conJ·,IL
feminism is reinstating the importance of such "female" value' ,
had been lost in the first-stage fervor for equality - for e.xarnpic
sharing, generosity, nurturance.
This shift in focus to the idea of "female" values has occurrc :
not only in popular and political thought but in the movement·, .1,"
demic rearguard as well, where it is taking on the greater sophistiLalt• r
of a purported third stage and promising vast changes forourrnlk, 111.
intellectual life. In November 1981, the New York Times dew1ed ..
front-page report to the burgeoning community of academic fc1111111.:
scholars. These scholars, the article said, see their work as far 1111•!,
than a simple addition to traditional intellectual history. After In 1n.
both separatism and mainstreaming as tactics for feminist thou~h1 1:
college courses, these scholars argue that feminist scholarship h.1·
entered a third, "corrective" stage in which its discoveries chalkn~·
the very assumptions of our culture. They claim that traditional ,ltJ,.;
arship is by no means a benign and neutral heritage for all. bur 1'
effect, a biased, sexist ideology characterized less by "univa,.1i
thought than by "male" patterns of thinking. Their goal is to Ji,cn1,·r
develop, and install the lost "female" element in each discipline
And some months ago, the New Republic featured an artilk t,.
Benjamin R. Barber, professor of political science at Rutgm. thJ:
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.i1tcmpted a deeper analysis of the hierarchies of feminist tl.<'Hght. A
:turd stage is necessary, Barber avers, because the second stage's eel. t'ral ion of female virtues seems indistinguishable from th~ original
·1l·rninine mystique" that produced the women's movem •1t in the
! 11 ,1 place. Barber argues that in the first stage, feminists ( cmanded
rti.11 women think like men. In the second, they insisted t'"'t it's all
: d1l to think like a woman. But the third stage goes even 1;,irther to
.kmand that female modes of thinking be accepted as equal to male.
1 11-.c the feminists quoted in the Times article, Barber eagerly antic1i.11cs the profound revision the "female" perspective wiJ'. bring to
111.11nstream intellectual life.
The viability of the distinction between stages two and three is
,,..tlly quite dubious, and the fact is that there has been a serious
:urnabout in feminist theory. It appears that the idea of sep< . ·te male
.ind female modes of thought and perception has now been blandly
.1, ,cpted as the good news that feminism was charged to bear. Hardly
.1111one, it seems, is examining the concept and the "proof" being
"' kred for it. Still fewer seem to have noted how radically it conflicts
11 rth earlier feminism's egalitarian activist aims, and finally, with any
~1nJ of feminist aim at all. For, while feminist scholars have -eversed
rh,·ir direction, and have gone fr..Jm denying sexual differences to
c·mphasizing and even valorizing them, in doing so, they have had to
.1,(cpt and even glorify some of the worst elements of male chauvinist
rll\ th. It is hard to understand how these feminists can fail ti~ see the
,,1,c they are making for the old traditional views and the way in
11h11.:h they are undermining their own goals.
Before elaborating on this point, I'd like to examine t ·iefly the
·methodology" that is most conspicuously operating in the, :w fem1nl\t criticism. We might look at the example of it that so impressed
l'rnfcssor Barber. Barber quotes feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan
J\ she substantiates her argument for the existence of a separ.
female
1~pc of morality:
I he· blind willingness to sacrifice people to truth [typical of male mora. 1 udgmentl
ha~ always been the danger of an ethics abstracted from life. This willi· 'less links
1 ;jnJhi to the Biblical Abraham, who prepared to sacrifice the life of his ~· n in order
1• 1 demonstrate the integrity and supremacy of his faith. Both men, in the
mitations
•I 1:1cir fatherhood, stand in implicit contrast to the woman who comes before Sol•rnun and verifies her motherhood by relinquishing truth in order to save the life of
t\cr l'hild.

\ow this may have a certain superficial truth about it, a kind of quaint,
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folklorish wisdom about the two sexes (although something we mi~hi
have expected to hear in the fifties rather than the eighties). But is 11
scholarship? The "methodology" seems to build entirely from 1hl·
assumption that if a male or female figure appears in a parable or ston.
this means we are to make direct associations between the type ;,,
behavior the figure represents and gender.
At least three objections can be made to this assumption. On,.
what about other incidents in the Bible, when women or men Lkl\
their so-called gender morality? For example, Jesus sacrificed pru;
ciple to life when he extended forgiveness to the woman taken 111
adultery. Jezebel, on the other hand, was willing to sacrifice the lik
of Elias to her principles (worship of Baal). Even more important 1,
the second objection. Why has the character's sex been assigned sul11
a direct and simplistic meaning? Given the evangelistic purpose of 1hl·
Bible, is it not more likely that the stories are meant to be seen s;. 111
bolically? If male and female characters are part of a story, the iJl'.i
being projected may have to do with different kinds of characterist1''
that are within the potential scope of each individual rather than v.11h
gender. Finally, and most important, the feminist analysis given ahoh·
misses the whole point of both stories. Both "female" and "male ·
moralities would be tragic if it were not for the balancing effect 111
the outside agent, combining mercy and justice. So, with female m11
rality alone, the wrong, unloving woman would get the baby, but lnr
the intervention of Solomon's wisdom. Likewise male morality alone
would have destroyed both Isaac and the future of Israel were it n111
for God's mercy shown at the penultimate moment. Thus we sec th<il
even when we grant the weight of restrictive sexual categories. \\l'
wind up in half truths, even falsehoods.
But I want to getback to the amazing contradiction between fem·
inism 's stage one and stage two/three, a contradiction that has not been
sufficiently noted. How did the change come about and where is i1
leading? I propose to examine the phenomenon of what I call femini,1
mysticism (special female modes of thinking, knowing, perceivin~.
and so on) through the feminist work done on literature.
Like feminism itself, feminist literary criticism has seen so1111:
remarkable shifts in its theoretical understructure. In the late sixtie'
and early seventies, this criticism worked to expose "sexist" attitude'
in literature, attitudes based on traditionally defined differences between men and women (for example, masculine activity, femininl·
passivity). The assumption behind this approach was that, were it n111
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ltir cultural imposition, men and women would be pretty much the
,;imc. Indeed, the course of earlier feminism and its literary criticism
,,cmed to be summed up in this bright promise by feminist critic
1>orin Schumacher: that "the idea of sex may be seen as simply that
- an idea in the mind of the writer, and not necessarily something
that must be accepted as real."
Almost imperceptibly, however, another strand of thought began
ltJ develop in feminist speculation-one that might have been thought
11K·ompatible with the first wave of feminist insistence on equality.
.\n interest emerged in what would be called by a variety of names:
1c111inine consciousness, the female sensibility, the female identity,
1hc female tradition, the female heritage. "We must find our own
1~1nguage and a fresh voice .... We are creating our own culture, from
past and present sources," proclaimed an early feminist literary journal (Aphra /, #I). In other words, there are differences between men
.ind women. The problem lies in how these have been traditionally
defined.
At times it seemed a synthesis could be found between early feminism and the wish expressed in the important later anthology of woml·n "s poetry, No More Masks: that is, an affirmation of the belief "in
the uniqueness of women." "We a..-e not men," the editors insisted,
··nor do we want to be. We are interested in our differences." The
,tilution might lie in the idea that women did not wish simply to step
into the world men have created, but to transform it, thus they needed
111 discover and preserve those qualities that would help them resist
1hc abuses of power that they found typical of men. A second corollary
1Jca bridged the contradiction by suggesting that women needed to
Jiscover their own true feminine identity and not to accept patriarchal
Jctinitions. Both ideas, however, strayed far from the egalitarian ac1ivism to which feminists were consciously committed into a new kind
of 4uietism: the idea that men and women literally inhabit separate
worlds and therefore have different reality systems, complete with
different psychological and linguistic practices. This amounted to a
virtual feminine mysticism. The search was on for female imagery,
female language, female traditions, female myths, female forms, and
even a female concept of poetic inspiration (how could it come to
women through the traditional female muse?).
This was an ironic twist of events, bringing a startling chain of
reversals in its wake. When a literary "double standard" was mcnl10ned prior to, say, 1975, it meant what early feminist critic Mary
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Ellmann mockingly called "phallic criticism" - male critics rcadin1:
books by women with reference to the sex of the author. Little JiJ
anyone know that a few short years later, feminist critics would ht·
out-Heroding Herod through the establishment of a new double stan
dard by which to judge the work of female writers. This new standard
was necessary, the feminists insisted, inasmuch as female writers c 111
not be held to criteria like generalization, objectivity, and universal it\.
because the sources of their experience are different from the patna.r
cha! traditions that generate these qualities. Indeed, the critics said.
subjectivity will be more visible in female poetry, because the elcmcnh
that make men objective are no part of the female acculturation pn.x:cs\
Likewise, it was said, female autobiographies could not be hl·IJ
to the same standards as male. A book like Kate Milieu's Flrin~
generally scored by critics for its confusion, pointlessness, lad pf
organization, idiosyncratic references, and tedious detail, must ht·
understood as a new kind of female art. Why? Because "any demand
that women write the same kind of formal, distilled narrative we LN1
ally get from men implies a belief that women share the same kind pf
reality as men; clearly this is not the case," argued Annette KoloJll\
in a lengthy apologia for the Millett book. Whether or not thi\ ''
"clearly" the case, what is clear is that the revolution had ended v.11h
what it had termed the worst chauvinist myth: that women arc incap
able of logic and objectivity.
A similar reversal occurred in the view of female biology and il,
role in creativity. A male critic caught unaware by the feminist mm'
ment in 1968 was perhaps surprised at being suddenly assailed lt•r
discussing a female author's sexual experience or lack of it in h1,
review of her book. But he was no doubt even more surprised tl'll
years later to find feminist literary critics themselves making pointl.'J
reference to whether a female author had married, borne children. Pr
Jived out of wedlock. Furthermore, in pre-mystical days, Ellmann anJ
other feminists had suggested that "phallic critics" employing the
"ovarian theory of literature" had wrongly made artistic creation seem
abnormal for a woman. But in 1978, Sandra Gilbert's and Susan Gu
bar's 700-page Madwoman in the Attic was devoted to expoundin~
how the nineteenth-century female writers managed the monumcntalh
difficult task of being both women and writers. By the time MinJJ
Rae Amiran could be found asserting in the pages of College Eng/iii·
that insufficient proof exists to establish that men and women live 111
separate spheres, and could be found asserting this as an argument
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against feminist critics, the circle had been completely closed, since
1inly a few years before this had been feminism's chief argument against
patriarchy.
The ironies were not Jost on certain feminist critics who hastened
t1i point out the creeping discrepancies. Elaine Showalter, for example. directed attention to what should have been obvious: that "the
theory of a female sensibility revealing itself in an imagery and form
\pecific to women always runs dangerously close to reiterating the
familiar stereotypes." Showalter offered a further caution. Such a
theory can suggest - and she implies that this would be unfortunate
- "permanence, a deep, basic, and inevitable difference between
male and female ways of perceiving the world." But before long even
wary critics like Showalter had capitulated with some version of
""women's culture," and what Showalter had called the "deep, basic,
Jnd inevitable difference between male and female" had become the
feminists' chief stock in trade (over the howls of creative writers like
Cynthia Ozick and Joyce Carol Oates, who resented the pinch of their
new classification as "women writers").
What had happened? Quite simply, before the insurgence of the
··female sensibility," feminist criticism had reached a dead end. Time
Jnd again, feminist critics were finding that they could not advance
hcyond the questionable occupation of cataloguing images of women
111 literature, as feminist critic Annette Kolodny pointed out in 1975
111 a review essay in the feminist periodical Signs. And if this cataloguing was not very fruitful for enhancing an appreciation of literature, neither was it very useful politically.
The literary criticism produced by the cataloguing approach had
proved entirely unsatisfactory, even to feminists. So far from establishing sex as having no reality, this kind of criticism kept getting
\luck in images of women as victims of or rebels against male dom111ation. Aside from being monotonous, this approach had a built-in
ambivalence. A female character's defeat could be either revolutionary
-in that it exposed women's oppression in patriarchy-or reactionary
- in that it discouraged women readers' aspirations. Likewise amhivalent were female triumphs: revolutionary- in that they encouraged women readers- and reactionary- in that they presented what
feminists saw as a false view of female possibilities under patriarchy.
Literature written by women had also failed to respond to the
revolutionary demands of feminism. Here the feminist endeavor was
less to expose sexist attitudes than to find a kind of hidden rebellion
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against patriarchal strictures. But here too the assumption was th; 11
women should rightfully oppose traditionally imposed sexual difkrences. As it turned out, however, what in women's literature was grl-.it
tended to resist feminist ideology; what was strongly feminist h:nJl'd
not to be literature after all. Further, much subliterature or populai
literature by women was, upon careful analysis, found not only 11111
to contain the, hoped for coded radicalism, but to be downright rl';1,
tionary. Even full-length feminist analyses of literature by woml' 11
were coming out, at least in the long run, with endorsements of tr; 1
ditional literary values and traditional human values as well. The mid
seventies saw the publication of a number of ambitious books ahuu 1
women writers - Patricia Meyer Spacks 's The F ema/e lmagi11mi1111.
Elaine Showalter's A literature of Their Own, Ann Douglas's /h,
Feminization of American Culture, and Ellen Moers's Literary Wo111rn
But these critics made no attempt to revise critical standards to ma~,·
room for forgotten female authors; their sense of what constitute\ ;i
great work of art remained firmly traditional. The unspoken condus11111
of these tentative quests for a "female" tradition as an alternati Vl' 111
the "male" was that the generally accepted tradition was not ··mak ·
at all but really a larger human tradition applicable to writers of huth
sexes.
Furthermore, feminist critics found themselves in a frustrat111~
position. Unable any longer to claim discrimination since Woml'n'
Studies departments were burgeoning and feminist criticism was he1n~
widely published, they could nonetheless sense that no one was re;tll\
listening. As Kolodny noted in 1976, feminist criticism "had made·
little discernible impact on the larger academic or critical community ·A couple of years later, Cheri Register inadvertently testilied tP
the aimlessness of feminist criticism when, after a half-hearted attempt
to document important new trends in feminist criticism, she wondered.
"What are we doing really? What is feminist about that? What ma~l''
it literary criticism?" Despite what would seem to be a persistent and
basic directionlessness, Register insisted that feminist criticism nH1'1
continue because, as she mournfully reported, "We have transformed
neither literary criticism nor the world."
Here wa'i the key. The cart was now openly before the horse. It
was not that critics were finding literary material opening up to fem
inist analysis; it was that the feminist analysis must be made to pre' ;iii
over literature for political reasons. A recent article expresses it ew1
more blatantly: referring to the idea of a feminine consciousness 111
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literary language, Mary Jacobus declares, "We need it, so we invent
11.

By 1982, Jane Marcus was desperate enough about the situation
tn prophesy the coming of the "literary amazon," the feminist critic
,if genius who will "deliver us from slavery to the canon, from racist,
,l'xist and classist misreadings." But if one were to analyze some of
the thorny impasses in feminist criticism to date, one would find little
reason to hope for a Messiah. The problem is not in the critics !l'minist critics are as bright and as imaginative and as productive as
they come. The "problem" is in literature itself and its resistance to
political manipulation. As Joan Didion warned in the movement's
c·arly days, "Art is in most ways hostile to id.!ology."
But the great shift occurred anyway. Feminists weren't winning
the game, so they changed the rules. If traditional literary aesthetics
.mJ the traditional literary canon were in the way of revolution, the
.111swer was, get rid of them, something eminently possible in the
irreverent atmosphere of contemporary literary criticism. Since "literary history is a fiction, a model of our own making," Annette Kol11Jny announced, "all the feminist is asserting is her own right to
l1hcrate new (and perhaps) different significances from" the "texts."
l'he "new (and perhaps) different significances" were sexual ones.
\Jot being able to make much of a case out of the more egalitarian
teminist model, feminist critics turned to the one thing perhaps least
,·,pccted of them: womanly emphasis on sex and insistence on their
'pecial abiding differences as females.
It should be obvious by now, however, that such insistence is selfddcating for feminism. To work in terms of female forms, female
language, female morality, female culture, and so on is to intensify
the limitations of gender. Such notions constitute mysticism-a retreat
lrom life as it is into an esoteric ideology that may seem comforting
111 the short run but is pernicious in the long. Of course there arc
differences between men and women (and it was none other than the
kminists who challenged these differences in the first place), but the
new mystical version of feminine nature is really just another evasion,
no truer to life than the original feminist model of absolute sameness.
The mystical model is an intellectual rendition of the ultra-feminine,
hy\tcrical seductiveness projected by a woman who is at base unsure
Jhout her femininity. Having denied the basic and obvious sexual
differences, as well as their implications, feminists are forced to sec
'cxuality everywhere, even in language, literature, and morality. Cer-
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tain truisms about sexual differences, which were once attacked h\
earlier feminist ideology, are now taken to such extremes that won11:~
are seen to be in possession of some kind of primitive magic 1h.1t
practically makes them a separate species. For example, Annette 1\11
lodny has gone so far as to argue that the "daily conversational n
changes" between men and women foster the "illusion of a wholh
shared common language" and mask the "inaccessibility of fcm;ik
meaning to male interpretation." Men must therefore "learn to •111
prehend the meanings encoded in texts by and about women. "
Also ironic is the way in which this mysticism is serving a' .i
cover, a front really, for female advancement, as if the advancem,111
were not a value in itself. A respondent to the Barber article in th,
New Republic explained that the purpose of third-stage feminism 1,
to "demonstrate the value of those human virtues that women h<J\l
developed more often than men, at. least partia~ly becau~e of .~he rl·
strictions on their lives." And the aim of the thud stage 1s to 111L11r
porate these desirable traits into all our institutions-not to le~ve thl.'111
the exclusive province of women." It appears, then, that this ne\11.'r
feminist ideology centers on the idea of a female moral ascendanl ~
Although feminists might hasten to disavow any innate moral sup'
riority, and might even rhetorically deny that an~ ~emale ~u~nont1
exists at all, the fact is, the whole thrust of femm1st mysticism 1s 1..
claim for women a moral purity not possessed by men, corrupted J'
they are by individualism and aggressiveness. So pervasive is this idi:J
throughout feminist literature and throughout much cu?'ent. t~ou~h1
as well that we hardly recognize it any longer for the s1mphst1c 1J,
ological assumption it is.
.
It seems that feminist mysticism locates the source of all evil 111
"male power." The extent to which this idea has been accepted 1,
astonishing. But once again we are in the land of folklore. In certam
vague ways it may seem that women are "better" than men - thc 1
are the sex that gives life (a function not always celebrated by fem1111st,
in other contexts, however), not the sex that kills, for example Ii
seems easy to conclude that men are more at cause for th~ evib (If
history, since they have held most of the positions of p~bhc power
But just how far can this contrast be taken before it gets ~illy: Arc~~
really to believe that women are any less capable of evil than men
of breaking the Ten Commandments? of abusing children? All tho'.'
people pouring into psychiatrists' offices and mental-health din 11.'
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have only their fathers to blame? And who's been raising all these
ferocious little males anyway?
Feminists seem to think that there is only one kind of evil - that
arising from violence or aggression, the kind of behavior more commonly associated with men. But women aren't any less capable of
,, ii because their superficial behavior is less identifiably aggressive.
<lcorge Orwell makes a distinction between two kinds of evil that is
.1pposite here. He contrasts a parent who aggressively threatens physical violence to control a child with one who cajolingly tries to manipulate the child through guilt. "And who would maintain," Orwell
.1,ks, "that the second method is less tyrannous than the first? The
J1stinction that really matters," he continues, "is not between violence
.ind non-violence, but between having and not having the appetite for
piiwcr." Feminists want power, they just don't want to admit nakedly
1hat they want it. And this covert need for power is one of the moti1 ations, perhaps unconscious, behind feminist mysticism.
For, indeed, despite its subversion of some of the basic goals and
principles of feminism, mysticism does provide a package of psychological benefits for feminists. As I have suggested, mysticism forms
.t good cover for their quest for power. Feminism as another dual ism,
male bad, female good- unreal but emotionally reassuring- forms
.1 hase from which women can achieve without guilt. For it seems that
,,rnnd/third stage feminism is to some degree in retreat from the more
,lirectly assertive qualities claimed for women in the first wave of
kminism, almost as if women themselves were uncomfortable with
1hcse qualities, perhaps uncomfortable with their own advance into
public life. Further, it would appear that the insistence on the moral
purity of women vs. the depravity of men - coupled with the idea
1hat the world is at the threshold of destruction as the result of male
power gone amok - gives women a fresh justification for their ad1ance. In short, feminist mysticism is a ploy to make women feel
there is a special need for them. They are not just moving ahead like
everybody else for "selfish" reasons. (In addition, it removes the onus
11f responsibility from individual women. If anything goes wrong, it
!.'.an be attributed to the masculine bias of our culture, not to women.)
Ironically, however, this idea fulfills the traditional image of women
Js ministers to others' needs, only now the "others" are the whole
planet.
But of course, no one - not women, not men, not the planet -
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is really served by emotional and intellectual dishonesty. T~c world
is not bad because of men; it's bad because people have an unlortun~ 11 _.
capacity for evil - for pride, hatred, envy, greed, mal~ce, lust, '"'
fishness, self-deception, and self-righteousness. Every time a woman
goes on about female virtues in a male-d~minated wort~. s~c j, ~1d
mitting her inability to face life as it is-w1th?ut a.screcn~n~ 1deolu~1
to Jessen its harshness. But it's only by facmg hfe as 1t 1s, not h1
pointing fingers at repositories of evil like male pow~r (or kv. hii
influence, or black inferiority) that we can make any real 1mprove111l·111
at all.
Now who would have thought we'd have to tell this to a group, •I
liberals like the feminists?

short story
shortening
BY PERCY SEITUN

Pride
Cordoba: D. H. Lawrence would have noticed the pride with which
many young Spanish mothers carry their cleanly clad babies in the
111wn.
,(l

Often, the mother holds the baby so high that, sitting on the throne
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111 her arms, it is taller than she.
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Herc's a young woman carrying her baby on the way to the market
'quare. She's lame. One of her legs is slightly withered. By marrying
h~r. her husband has compensated her a thousand times over and will
r~main better than clear of debt to her for the rest of his life. His grace
\\ill prevail; she will never cross him.
I've also concluded that this is her first and only child for all time,
.111d that before she became pregnant and bore it there was some queslwn as to whether she would be capable of having a child at all. I
~now, too, that very early this morning, the husband went off on his
motorcycle to his job as stonemason? carpenter? electrician? and that
!he baby, not more than eight months old now, has come between the
husband and his young wife, as babies do. But the husband's whole
upbringing has prepared him for this and he is a proud father. Nevertheless, he - a usurper - has been usurped. But the two years he
lived alone with his wife before the baby came were much too long.
By the time she gave birth, he was ready for it and only vaguely aware
that he could have remained a son if he had never become a father.
I know that after work he does not go home directly but stops at
a bodega for a glass of wine and a game of dados. The bodega is alive

